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This special issue celebrates the 100th anniversary of the Little Albert study, published 
in February 1920, which marked the birth of human fear conditioning research. The collection 
of papers in this special issue provides a snapshot of the thriving state of this field today. In this 
Editorial, we first trace the historical roots of the field and then provide a conceptual analysis 
of the many ways in which human fear conditioning is currently used in theory and treatment 
development, with special reference to the contributions in this special issue. Ivan P. Pavlov 
allegedly claimed that “If you want new ideas, read old books”. We could not agree more; it is 
our conviction that tracing the roots of our field illuminates current trends and will contribute 

















The Little Albert study was the first fear conditioning experiment ever conducted on a 
human subject. As we will show below, this single experiment with one single subject and only 
crude measurements pioneered the principles of experimental psychopathology and behavior 
therapy. It would take several more decades before these two domains got traction, but the core 
principles were already spelled out in a series of papers in the 1910s and 1920s by John Broadus 
Watson, lead author of the Little Albert study. He also had an enormous impact on experimental 
psychology by convincing his fellow researchers to change their methods and goals, and he laid 
the ground for laboratory-based applied psychology at the same time. Elements of his approach 
to psychology, which he coined Behaviorism, are still mainstream today, even though many 
psychologists would hesitate or downward refuse to identify as such. But anyone who practices 
experimental psychology or exposure treatment is following the footsteps of John B. Watson. 
This includes researchers who focus on brain mechanisms. We will substantiate these assertions 
below, but let’s have a closer look first at the study that changed the face of psychology. 
1. How Albert became afraid of rats 
A toddler named Albert showed no sign of fear when confronted with a range of stimuli, 
including a rat, a rabbit, a fur coat or even a burning newspaper. One of the few things that 
upset little Albert was a loud clanging noise. John B. Watson and Rosalie Rayner took 
advantage of these differences in emotional reactivity to test the possibility of conditioning 
emotional reactions. In order to do so, they put the rat in front of Albert and then produced the 
clanging noise by striking a hammer on a suspended steel bar.  
The first experimental session contained two pairings of the rat and the loud noise. One 
week later, Albert showed some sign of fear when exposed to the rat alone (“…no tendency at 
first to reach for it”, Watson & Rayner, 1920, p. 4). After five more pairings in that session, 
exposure to the rat alone elicited a strong fear reaction, as indicated in the experimental notes: 
“The instant the rat was shown the baby began to cry. Almost instantly he turned sharply to the 
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left, fell over on left side, raised himself on all fours and began to crawl away so rapidly that he 
was caught with difficulty before reaching the edge of the table” (Watson & Rayner, 1920, p. 
5). When presented with toy blocks, on the other hand, Albert was calm and interacted in a 
playful manner. This indicated that the loud clanging noise did not induce a chronic anxious 
state in Albert. His newly learned fear was specific to the rat, or so it seemed. 
Watson and Rayner hypothesized that the conditional fear reactions would extend 
beyond the conditional stimulus (the rat).1 They investigated this hypothesis by employing a 
generalization test procedure, in which, after five days, they exposed Albert to the range of 
stimuli from the pre-conditioning baseline measurement (rabbit, fur coat, etc.). Most stimuli 
now also elicited the fear reactions. A repetition of the same test 5 days later yielded similar 
results. Immediately after the last test, the dog and the rabbit were paired with the loud noise 
for the first time, followed by another round of generalization tests in a different context (a well-
lit lecture room, instead of the dimmed room of the laboratory). In this new context, the fear 
reactions were weaker but still noticeable to the original and the new conditional stimuli. 
Follow-up tests after one month still showed signs of fear to the rat and the other stimuli. 
Watson and Rayner concluded (p. 12; italics added): “These experiments would seem to show 
conclusively that directly conditioned emotional responses as well as those conditioned by 
transfer persist, although with a certain loss in the intensity of the reaction, for a longer period 
than one month. Our view is that they persist and modify personality throughout life.”  
Given that the newly conditioned fear did not disappear by itself, Watson and Rayner 
advocated the need for active methods that could remove such fear. They were all set to test out 
a number of methods, but Albert was adopted and left the hospital before they could carry out 
the envisioned experiments. In the Discussion section of the 1920 paper, they generously gave 
away their ideas for such methods, including (1) repeated exposures to the rat, (2) pairing the 
rat with positive rewards, (3) stimulating approach behaviors towards the rat, and (4) modeling 
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non-fearful interactions with the rat. It does not take much to recognize the key ingredients of 
modern-day cognitive behavioral therapy for reducing fear and anxiety. In addition, and as 
illustrated in this special issue, these proposed methods continue to rank among the most 
popular topics in the field of human fear conditioning (extinction, counterconditioning, 
approach-avoidance, social learning). 
A few years later, Watson was able to test the proposed methods in collaboration with 
Mary Cover-Jones, who had graduated from Vassar College, Baltimore, the same year as 
Rosalie Rayner, Watson’s co-author on the Little Albert study. Upon Rayner’s 
recommendation, Mary Cover Jones had attended a weekend lecture by Watson at Columbia 
University, New York, in 1919, after which she decided to embark on graduate studies in 
psychology with the aim of testing the proposed methods to eliminate fears in children. The 
results appeared in two papers in 1924 (Jones, 1924a,b), one of them reporting the case of Little 
Peter who had very similar fears as those installed in Little Albert. With great eye for detail and 
systematicity, she tested the different methods and recorded behavioral indices of Peter’s 
progress during these exposure sessions. Counterconditioning proved to be the most efficient 
technique in this case. Interestingly, she also reported a case of reinstatement avant la lettre 
when Peter’s fear of rats returned after he had been attacked by a dog (as indicated by point b 
on the graph on p. 465 and clarified in the main text on p. 466; Jones, 1924a).  
The translational ambition of the field of human fear conditioning is rooted in these two 
seminal studies on Little Albert and Little Peter. The Little Albert study effectively translated 
the principles of Pavlovian conditioning from salivary reflexes in dogs to emotional reactions 
in a human child. Such cross-species translation was regarded by Watson as one of the core 
goals of psychology: “The man and the animal should be placed as nearly as possible under the 
same experimental conditions” (Watson, 1913, p. 252). This approach is still followed in many 
studies today that test hypotheses from the rodent laboratory in human fear conditioning. The 
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Little Peter study, on the other hand, provided an early example of lab-to-clinic translation in 
which principles from the laboratory are tested in an applied setting with the aim of optimizing 
evidence-based treatment. To Watson, treatment is applied experimental psychology, and 
clinicians are practitioners of scientific principles.       
The Little Albert study and Watson’s views foreshadowed experimental 
psychopathology as a field of psychological research: “[The psychiatrist’s] interest is largely in 
the patient and need not be particularly scientific. The psychologist, on the other hand, cannot 
afford to rest until he controls his phenomena – until he can not only produce [maladaptive 
responses] and study the laws of their production, but also reduce and break them up at will and 
learn the principles controlling their reduction. He must find a uniform procedure which will 
allow at least approximate reproducibility of his results. In general, he must have his 
phenomena under such control that he can watch their inception, course, and end.” (Watson & 
Morgan, 1917, p. 168, italics added). 
It is almost incredible that one single experiment with a sole participant was so ground-
breaking in the light of contemporary approaches to clinical treatment and translational 
research. And there was even more than that: The Little Albert study2 also had widespread 
theoretical implications. 
2. Conditioned emotional reactions. 
It is interesting that Watson and Rayner did not title their 1920 article “The case of Little Albert” 
or “A laboratory model of fear”. Instead, they chose “Conditioned emotional reactions”. This 
title may ordinarily not catch much attention, but it was spot on.  
 At the time, the field of psychology was dominated by the Wundtian method of 
introspection. This method relied on subjects trained in the introspective method to observe and 
report their own conscious reactions to external situations. A study consisted, for example, of 
trained subjects viewing pictures of different shades of grey and reporting how these elicited 
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isolable sensation attributes, such as quality, extension, duration, intensity, clearness etc. (see 
Watson, 1913, p. 249-250). Watson criticized this method on three grounds. First, he did not 
agree that experimental psychology should aim for analyzing conscious states into 
introspectively isolable elements. Rather, he asserted, “Its theoretical goal is the prediction and 
control of behavior” (Watson, 1913, p. 248). The relevance of psychology to other scientific 
fields and society will not come from endlessly introspecting one’s own conscious impressions. 
Instead, it will require identifying the variables that reliably predict and control behavior. By 
conditioning emotional reactions, Watson showed how even the most intimate phenomena, our 
emotions, are subject to environmental control. Moreover, this approach shed light on the 
mechanism that brings about these emotions, rather than providing a sheer endless inventory of 
their appearances.   
Watson’s second critique to the method of introspection was that replications were 
practically impossible. Differences in results between identical experiments could always be 
due to differences in mastery of the introspective method by the trained subjects in one’s 
laboratory. Or, as Watson puts it: “If you fail to reproduce my findings, it is not due to some 
fault in your apparatus or in the control of your stimulus, but it is due to the fact that your 
introspection is untrained… The attack is made upon the observer and not upon the 
experimental setting.” (Watson, 1913, p. 249). By relying on objectively observable behaviors, 
on the other hand, the replicability of the conditioning of emotional reactions is testable: 
“Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental branch of natural 
science” (Watson, 1913, p. 248). 
The third critique of Watson had to do with the relevance of psychology as a scientific 
and applied discipline. Who cares about subjective conscious impressions of a trained subject 
who is viewing shades of grey? Outside of the Wundtian laboratory, so claims Watson, 
practically nobody. “The psychologist is being constantly asked by his own students as well as 
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by the physicians, educators, and jurists: “Why do you not work upon the emotions? They are 
of more importance in the guidance and control of the human organism than any of your hair-
splitting work upon thresholds.” (Watson & Morgan, 1917, p. 164). By studying conditional 
emotional reactions, he hoped to increase the influence of psychology in science and society. 
“If psychology would follow the plan I suggest, the educator, the physician, the jurist and the 
businessman could utilize our data in a practical way, as soon as we are able, experimentally, 
to obtain them.” (Watson, 1913, p. 251).   
3. John B. Watson’s theory of emotions 
The Little Albert study pioneered the field of experimental psychopathology and challenged 
the introspectionists, but it also served to contrast different theories of emotion. Watson and 
Morgan (1917) outlined the different perspectives on emotion that existed at the time. It had 
become mainstream since the work of Charles Darwin that we share emotional expressions with 
many other species and that even our emotions may have developed via the principles of natural 
selection (Darwin, 1872). Watson and others believed that at least some basic emotions must 
be inherited to a certain degree, but the question remained as to how many basic emotions we 
are born with. Two different psychological approaches existed at the time with regard to the 
problem of emotion.  
Edward Thorndike proposed that most of our emotions are inherited. He went at great 
lengths to analyze all possible human emotions and to enumerate with painstaking detail the 
stimulus-response associations that characterize these emotions (Thorndike, 1913). Watson 
applauded this effort of systematically analyzing human emotions but doubted whether they are 
all inherited. After observing hundreds of infants in his own laboratory (Watson & Rayner, 
1921), Watson came to a different conclusion: “We have reason to think that very many of the 
reactions which Thorndike puts down as original in the nature of the infant are undoubtedly the 
product of the environment” (Watson & Morgan, 1917, p. 165). He also questioned the 
 10 
methodological approach of Thorndike: “Depending blindly upon the fact that emotional 
reactions are hereditary, we have put emphasis on trying to enumerate the hundreds of objects 
and situations which produce the hundred or so of emotional reactions, instead of taking 
emotions as we find them and trying to put them under experimental control” (Watson & 
Morgan, 1917, p. 168). A true psychological understanding of emotions, according to Watson, 
rests on the ability to predict and control these emotions.  
Sigmund Freud took an approach that was opposite to Thorndike’s. Freud provided a 
very parsimonious account of emotions, but too narrow in Watson’s eyes (Watson & Morgan, 
1917). Freud’s theory highlights the primacy of only one basic emotion, namely sex (rephrased 
by Watson as ‘love’; current terminology would be ‘desire’). All the other emotions would then 
later be derived from this one basic emotion (e.g., fear may derive from an apprehension that a 
loved one might disappear). In his own systematic analysis of infant behaviors, Watson 
observed more emotional expressions and took issue with the sole emphasis on the emotion of 
sex. In addition, the Little Albert study proved that fears can develop through mere pairings of 
a neutral stimulus with an aversive stimulus. “Fear does not gather its potency in any derived 
manner from love. It belongs to the original and inherited nature of man” (Watson & Rayner, 
1920, p. 14). They further attacked the psychoanalytic method with an ironic prophecy: “The 
Freudians twenty years from now… when they come to analyze Albert’s fear of a seal skin 
coat… will probably tease from him the recital of a dream which upon their analysis will show 
that Albert at three years of age attempted to play with the pubic hair of the mother and was 
scolded violently for it. (We are by no means denying that this might in some other case 
condition it.)” (Watson & Rayner, 1920, p. 14).  
Watson took position somewhere in between Thorndike and Freud. Based on 
observations of hundreds of infants in his own lab, he claimed the primacy of three basic 
emotions in the infant from which all emotions in adult-life are derived: fear, love and rage. 
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But, “It may be argued that if these three emotional reactions are the important ones and that if 
the stimuli which call them out are as simple and crude as we now suppose them to be, then our 
theory of the emotions is superficial and patently unable to care for the enormous complexity 
in the shading of emotional reactions in adults.” (Watson & Morgan, 1917, p. 168). He believed 
to have found the answer in the mechanism of Pavlovian conditioning. He came to believe that 
through conditioning an increasing number of stimuli triggers these emotions and that through 
conditioning-by-transfer (generalization) the various emotions combine and interact in an ever-
widening array of stimuli that shape the rich variety of emotional experiences.  
The Little Albert study challenged Freud’s hypothesis that the emotion of fear is merely 
derived from sex and it also challenged Thorndike’s hypothesis that most adult-life emotions 
are inherited. In Watson’s eyes, the mechanism of Pavlovian conditioning (plus 
transfer/generalization) was sufficient to explain the development of all adult-life emotions 
from a parsimonious set of three inherited emotions: fear, love and rage. This crude theory of 
emotion is obviously outdated, and the concept of basic emptions has since been questioned 
(Lange, Dalege, Borsboom, van Kleef, & Fischer, 2020), but it did provide an important step 
forward at the time. This further demonstrates the pervasive implications of this single study 
with a sole participant for multiple directions of psychological inquiry.   
4. The behavioral neuroscientist inside John B. Watson 
Watson had a prime interest in animal and human biology. The term ‘Behaviorism’ seems to 
suggest that he only cared for studying the laws between external stimuli and reactions, but this 
is not entirely true. The emphasis was indeed on psychology as a branch of the natural sciences, 
and on the use of experimental methodology to predict and control behavior. But his interest 
also extended to the inner biological structures that make behavior possible, such as the 
functional anatomy of muscles, glands and the central nervous system. Human biology featured 
prominently in his book Behaviorism (Watson, 1924), a collection of introductory lectures to 
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behaviorist psychology, where he devoted two entire chapters to it. He embraced biological 
mechanisms as far as they contributed to an understanding of behavior. Even in his own 
laboratory, during initial attempts to set up human conditioning techniques, he applied a variety 
of psychophysiological measurements, such as the psycho-galvanic reflex (akin to the skin 
conductance response), the pupillary reflex, respiratory reflex (breathing volumetric 
parameters), and heartbeat (Watson, 1916).    
  Watson welcomed contributions from biology to the understanding of behavior, but he 
was also wary of an overly narrow emphasis on the central nervous system: “Should we as 
behaviorists be especially interested in the central nervous system?” (Watson, 1924, p. 43). He 
argued that the central nervous system is not more important in the production of behavior than 
muscles or glands. It is just one of the many parts of the whole organism that make behavior 
possible: “For the behaviorist the nervous system is, 1st, a part of the body—no more mysterious 
than muscles and glands; 2nd, it is a specialized body mechanism that enables its possessor to 
react more quickly and in a more integrated way with muscles or glands when acted upon by a 
given stimulus than would be the case if no nervous system were present” (Watson, 1924, p. 
43). There are many species without a central nervous system that adjust their behavior 
adaptively to their environment. This is all behavior, up and down the evolutionary scale. 
Watson agrees that the central nervous system makes more complex patterns of behavior 
possible, but this is not more essential to the understanding of behavior than muscles and glands.   
This bold argument served to further separate the behaviorist from the introspectionist 
view. “To understand why it hurts the feelings of the introspectionist for the behaviorist to place 
no more emphasis on the brain and the spinal cord than upon the striped muscles of the body, 
the plain muscles of the stomach, the glands etc., you must remember that the nervous system 
to the introspectionist has always been a mystery box—whatever he couldn’t explain in 
‘mental’ terms he pushed over into the brain. Many of our so-called physiological psychologies 
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are filled with pretty pictures of brain and spinal cord schemes.” (Watson, 1924, p. 43, italics 
added). Could this be more relevant today? In recent years, there has been increasing 
acknowledgement that the seductive allure of colorful images of brain activations can stand in 
the way of rigorous science (Beck, 2010; Hopkins, Weisberg, & Taylor, 2016; Weisberg, Keil, 
Goodstein, Rawson, & Gray, 2008). The introspectionist’s trap may have opened once again. 
Given that a single pattern brain activity will always be compatible with multiple psychological 
theories, psychological interpretations of fMRI-based brain activations are necessarily 
speculative. Still, they are the rule rather than the exception. This threatens to weaken 
psychology, and ultimately neuroscience as well: Neuroscience needs rigorous behavioral 
experimentation (Krakauer, Ghazanfar, Gomez-Marin, MacIver, & Poeppel, 2017).  
Of course, there are very good arguments for focusing on the brain, where most neural 
plasticity occurs. But Watson reminds us that the brain does not live in a vacuum. It is one of 
many parts that mediate between stimulus input and response output. Therefore, “… the 
behaviorist has to be vitally interested in the nervous system but only as an integral part of the 
whole body” (Watson, 1924, p. 43).  
5. Post-Watsonian developments in human fear conditioning 
Soon after publication of the Little Albert study, clinical case reports confirmed that phobias 
can be traced back to aversive conditioning experiences (Bagby, 1922; Anderson, 1927). It is 
good to repeat here that this was diametrically opposite to the dominant Freudian view at the 
time, which claimed that symptoms of anxiety (including phobic symptoms) result from 
repressed sexual desires. Treatments focused on these underlying sexual desires and their 
repression, rather than on the fear itself. The new approach claimed that problems of fear were, 
well, problems of fear, and should be treated as such.  
In the fear conditioning laboratory, the first developments focused on replicating the 
Little Albert study (Moss, 1924; English, 1929; Bregman, 1934, Jones, 1930). Most of the work 
 14 
was done by Harrold E. Jones, husband of Mary C. Jones and assistant professor at Columbia 
University. He perfected the methods used by Watson in many ways. To the positivist Jones, 
the use of observer’s reports to infer emotional reactions was still insufficient for a truly 
objective investigation of human fear conditioning. He presented his first results at the 36th 
annual symposium of APA in 1927, titled “Conditioned Psychogalvanic Responses in Infants”. 
In three infants, he paired previously indifferent stimuli (cutaneous, auditory, and visual) with 
electrical stimulation of the skin and consistently observed increased psychogalvanic responses 
(akin to the skin conductance reaction). Jones noted that “… the overt behavior of the infants 
showed no correlated effects; the evidence for conditioning was derived entirely from the 
instrumental records” (Jones, 1928, p. 184). In a follow-up study, he further included a neutral 
stimulus that was equally often presented but never paired with the electrical stimulation, as a 
baseline comparison for the conditional psychogalvanic response (Jones, 1931). Differential 
conditioning, aversive electrical stimulation, skin conductance recording: The human fear 
conditioning laboratory was born! 
During the 1930s, the emphasis shifted from the clinical-translational and emotional 
angle towards the cross-species translation of basic principles of classical conditioning to 
human subjects. A factor in this is that Pavlov’s complete work had recently become accessible 
with the publication of a full English translation of his book Conditioned Reflexes (Pavlov, 
1927). Before that, only the basics of Pavlov’s work were accessible, including to Watson, in 
one translated lecture published in The Lancet (Pavlov, 1906). Bass & Hull (1934) took the lead 
with the study of conditional fear generalization (“irradiation”) by reproducing as closely as 
possible a generalization experiment from Pavlov’s laboratory in which spatial distance 
between tactile stimulations served as the similarity dimension. Subjects were naked and laid 
face-down on a bench. A tactile stimulation over the shoulder was followed by an intense 
electric stimulation to the wrist. During test, more distant tactile stimulations on the subject’s 
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back toward the calf triggered progressively weaker psychogalvanic responses, resulting in the 
typical shape of the gradient. Bass and Hull went on to characterize the generalization gradient 
of extinction as well. But they duly noted some obstacles with their newly developed procedure: 
“Several men declined to act as subjects because they objected either to being shocked or to the 
removal of their clothing” (Bass & Hull, 1934, p. 54).  
 The 1930s became the decade of generalization. Most notably, Carl I. Hovland 
published a series of four papers with systematical investigations of the generalization gradient 
in auditory conditioning (Hovland, 1937a-d). He manipulated factors like tone frequencies and 
intensities, differential conditioning, reinforcement rate, extinction training, lapse of time, etc. 
The results refuted Pavlov’s cortical irradiation theory of generalization (Pavlov, 1927). 
According to this theory, the degree of generalization between two stimuli mirrors the cortical 
distance between their neural representations. Activation of one representation spreads 
(“irradiates”) over the cortex and activates the other representation proportional to the distance 
travelled. The results of Bass and Hull (1934) previously confirmed this theory, because tactile 
stimulations of body parts are topographically organized in the somatosensory cortex: the 
cortical distance between shoulder and calf is larger than between shoulder and lower back. 
Tone frequencies are topographically organized in the primary auditory cortex and so the 
generalization gradient over tone frequencies was also in line with the irradiation hypothesis 
(Hovland, 1937a). But then Hovland demonstrated a similar gradient over tone intensities, 
which are not spatially distributed over the cortex (Hovland, 1937b). This disconfirmed the 
irradiation hypothesis and inspired novel conceptualizations of the generalization process (Hull, 
1947; Lashley & Wade, 1946).  
Hovland (1937c) also investigated extinction and recovery of conditional 
psychogalvanic responses. One of his experiments was aimed to test ‘disinhibition’ in humans. 
This phenomenon, once again first described by Pavlov (1927), referred to the observation that 
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addition of a neutral stimulus to a conditioned-and-extinguished stimulus triggers a return of 
the conditional response (see also Switzer, 1933). As the additional neutral stimulus, Hovland 
switched off the houselights and indeed observed a return of the psychogalvanic response. To 
the extent that light/dark changes can be considered contextual changes (Vansteenwegen et al., 
2005), this report represents the first demonstration of contextual renewal (AAB-renewal 
specifically). Learning theorists at the time explained extinction in terms of inhibition learning, 
which could be easily disturbed by the lapse of time or changes in the external situation (like 
the addition of a neutral stimulus; Pavlov, 1927; Hull, 1943). These ideas are still engrained in 
the currently dominant view on fear extinction learning and retention (Bouton, 2002).  
 It is interesting to see that many of the processes under investigation today were already 
at the forefront in Watson’s pioneering work and in the ensuing wave of human fear 
conditioning researchers (extinction, generalization, recovery…). There are more examples, 
like Cook and Harris (1937) who reported that instructing subjects that a green light would be 
followed by an electrical stimulation immediately elicited increased psychogalvanic response 
on the first presentation of the green light. Likewise, instructing the absence of further 
stimulations after actual light—shock pairings abolished the conditional response immediately. 
Such demonstrations of instructed conditioning and instructed extinction generated great 
interest in recent years (Mertens, Boddez, Sevenster, Engelhard, & De Houwer, 2018).  
But it’s equally interesting to note what was not on the research agenda in those days: 
individual differences. The field was geared towards translating and testing the basic principles 
from Pavlov’s laboratory to the human case. The goal was to reveal universal laws of learning: 
how we are all alike, not how we all differ. Nonetheless, Pavlov himself did have a keen interest 
in individual differences. He even developed a temperamental typology of his dogs, as a proxy 
for distinct central nervous system organizations, and documented how these influenced the 
course of conditioning (Pavlov, 1927). This aspect of Pavlov’s work has been taken up more 
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recently, with a surge of interest in individual differences in human fear conditioning, paralleled 
by a modal shift towards personalization in biomedical research and an increased emphasis on 
the individual in the humanities and society as a whole.    
6. Standing on the shoulders of giants 
One hundred years after the development of the human fear conditioning procedure, the number 
of research lines and publications today is unprecedented. On top of what we discussed above, 
additional seeds for this wealth were planted in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Arguably, 
however, the field really took off in the late 1990s, when novel developments in the animal 
laboratory met with clinical interest. On the one hand, the seminal work of Mark Bouton on the 
extinction and recovery of fear, and his relentless argumentation for its clinical applicability, 
paved the way for a clinical translational research agenda centered around extinction (Bouton, 
2002). On the other hand, the work of Joseph LeDoux on neural processes of fear conditioning 
in rats (LeDoux, 2003) and the advent of functional neuroimaging techniques (MRI) in humans 
ignited experimental validation of cross-species translation to the human case. The Bouton and 
LeDoux lines came together in the early 2000s with the work of Gregory Quirk, Elisabeth 
Phelps and others, which spurred an investigation into the behavioral and neural processes of 
the extinction and return of fear (Milad & Quirk, 2012). Findings that pharmacological adjuncts 
can strengthen the cellular process of fear extinction and boost long-term extinction retention 
further bolstered attention in this area (Singewald, Schmuckermair, Whittle, Holmes, & 
Ressler, 2015). Fascination also emerged concerning reports that administration of 
pharmacological agents before or after presenting a fear-conditioned stimulus can reduce fear 
responding and its return in the absence of further extinction training (i.e., reconsolidation 
interference techniques; Beckers & Kindt, 2017). Although some of the initial enthusiasm has 
waned after a couple of failed replications (Chalkia et al., 2020; Chalkia, Weermeyer, Van 
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Oudenhove & Beckers, 2019), the hopes remain that innovative laboratory developments will 
one day improve current treatments for psychological suffering.    
The contemporary field of human fear conditioning has diversified beyond extinction 
and reconsolidation research alone. With this special issue, we take a snapshot of the many 
different research topics that are being covered today. Despite their variety, all contributing 
articles have one thing in common: The human fear conditioning model that was developed in 
embryonic form by Watson and confederates a century ago. Each contributing article uses this 
fear conditioning model from a unique and often inter-disciplinary angle. This testifies to the 
strength of the model at the intersection of many different research interests, but this 
intersectional position may also invoke the danger of losing conceptual clarity. What do 
contemporary researchers mean when they talk about the fear conditioning model? This is not 
always clear. Below, we analyze the different uses of this term in the literature, because we 
believe that conceptual clarity is essential for future progress. Along the way, we refer to the 
contributions to the current special issue in italics.  
7. Meanings of the term ‘human fear conditioning model’ 
The terms that we use to describe our research endeavors may influence our thinking about the 
processes involved. For example, when we apply an ‘attention task’ in our experiments, we are 
prone to interpreting any result in terms of attentional processes. In our papers, we often use 
the term ‘human fear conditioning model’ to describe the type of experiments that we conduct. 
However, there are many meanings that go under that umbrella term. A clear view on those 
meanings may contribute to a precise interpretation of our research findings.  
7.1. A model as a procedure that models something else 
Human fear conditioning is first and foremost a procedure. In general terms, a procedure is 
what a researcher does when carrying out an experiment (De Houwer & Hughes, 2020). In the 
case of fear conditioning, this entails – very much in the tradition of Watson and his successor 
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Jones – presenting aversive stimulus pairings and assessing changes in fear-related responding. 
It is important to delineate the hypothesized process in a model from its procedure. This is why 
the Pavlovian conditioning model is still relevant today: Even though some early hypotheses 
about processes have been discarded (including Pavlov’s theory; 1927), the procedure lives on.   
A procedure becomes a model in the true meaning of the word if researchers assume 
that it models or provides an analogy for something else (i.e., the target phenomenon; Weisberg, 
2013). The use of laboratory models is omnipresent in science. For example, in biomedical 
sciences, synthetic ion channels are sometimes used as a model of natural ion channels, as this 
facilitates aspects of the research process (Chen & Hou, 2018). In the case of human fear 
conditioning, the target phenomenon often concerns psychological suffering as seen in anxiety- 
and stress-related disorders (sometimes as part of other forms of suffering such as chronic pain; 
Meulders, this issue). As with any model, this begs the question to what extent findings obtained 
with the model are informative with respect to the target phenomenon. When we study human 
fear conditioning in the laboratory, do we only learn about the behavior and (neural) processes 
that occur within the limits of that procedure, or do we also learn something about psychological 
suffering in the world outside the laboratory? This issue of external validity is so critical to the 
field of human fear conditioning that several contributions in the special issue touch upon it 
(Bach & Melinscak, this issue; De Houwer, this issue; Fullana et al, this issue; Hammel, 
Helwig, Kaczkurkin, Sponheim, & Lissek, this issue; Pölchen et al., this issue). We will cover 
this matter in more detail in section 8.   
7.2. A model as a hypothesis about the cause of behavior 
The term fear conditioning model is sometimes used to refer to a theory (the hypothesized 
process) rather than to a procedure. In this sense, the fear conditioning model holds that anxiety-
, trauma- and stress-related complaints in the population are conditioning effects (at least for a 
subset of sufferers; Rachman, 1977), meaning that they result from a previous pairing of stimuli 
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(De Houwer, this issue; Vervliet & Boddez, 2020). Once again, the influence of Watson is clear 
in this.  
Most researchers also invoke a specific mental mechanism when they use the term fear 
conditioning model in this sense. For example, according to one influential view, invoking the 
fear conditioning model implies invoking a mental landscape that consists of associations 
between stimulus representations (for a critical discussion of association formation models and 
alternative views see De Houwer, this issue). Associations can be defined as links that transmit 
activation from one representation to another, which may remind us of the way in which a strip 
of copper wire conducts electricity (Haselgrove, 2016; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 
2009). Representations often remain undefined but can be understood as mental imprints, 
comparable to physical imprints (e.g., a neon sign or a drawing in clay; Holland, 1993; Skinner, 
1977). So, the idea here is that presentation of the conditional stimulus activates both its own 
mental representation and that of the unconditional stimulus, which (via some unspecified way) 
then leads to fear. The simplicity of the association formation model may be what makes it so 
attractive. A risk, however, is that researchers may treat associative activation as a blank canvas 
on which they project a variety of actually incompatible constructs. For example, associative 
activation has been treated as equivalent with both expectancies concerning future events and 
memories of past events, which seems contradictory (for an extensive discussion, see 
Jozefowiez, 2018). In other words, researchers may expect more of associations as compared 
to what the construct sensu stricto allows3.  
8. Testing the link between model and suffering outside the laboratory  
We have seen that the term fear conditioning model is on some occasions used to refer to a 
laboratory procedure that aims to model (i.e., simulate) psychological suffering as seen in 
anxiety- and stress-related disorders, while on other occasions used to refer to more or less 
specified hypotheses about the origin of such suffering in the population. The study of 
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moderators of the relation between stimulus pairings and behavioral changes (i.e., of 
conditioning effects) is crucial to assess the value of the fear conditioning model in both 
meanings of the term. 
First, with respect to the value of the laboratory procedure, it is of the essence to assess 
whether what moderates performance in the laboratory also moderates anxiety- and stress-
related complaints in the world outside the laboratory. If so, then this supports the external 
validity of the model (i.e., what is learned from the model extends to the target phenomenon) 
and we can rest assured that we can continue to invest in fear conditioning research (see De 
Houwer, this issue; Scheveneels, Boddez, & Hermans, 2019; Vervliet & Raes, 2013). The idea 
here is that a higher number of moderators that show parallel effects in the model and for the 
target phenomenon will increase the chance that a new and untested factor will also show 
parallel effects (e.g., a new intervention developed in the laboratory; see Keller, Hennings, & 
Dunsmoor, this issue; Lipp, Waters, Luck, Ryan, & Craske, this issue). This requires a research 
program that tests moderators in the model and of the target phenomenon, and that assesses 
overlap in the effects.  
Second, with respect to theory development, accumulating knowledge about the 
moderating conditions under which stimulus pairings produce increased fear reactions, allows 
us to refine our theories about the pathways towards anxiety- and stress-related complaints in 
the world outside the laboratory. This will enable us to make (more) precise predictions about 
the onset and course of psychological suffering.  
The last 100 years have seen a plethora of laboratory research on moderators, and 
several papers in this special issue carry on this important tradition. For example, the extent to 
which pairings of stimuli will result in fear responding may depend on characteristics of the 
stimuli, the behavior under investigation, and the participant (for a full taxonomy, see De 
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Houwer & Hughes, 2020). Below, we discuss these moderators and make humble suggestions 
for another 100 years of progress in human fear conditioning research. 
8.1. Stimulus characteristics 
Pavlov and Watson emphasized the importance of stimulus pairings as a prerequisite of 
conditioning but did not pay much attention to the characteristics of the stimuli involved. The 
last 100 years have shown that this is an oversight: Stimuli are key moderators of fear 
conditioning. The extent of the behavioral change due to stimulus pairings indeed depends on 
stimulus characteristics including the fear relevance of the conditional stimulus (e.g., flowers 
versus spiders; Öhman & Mineka, 2001), the source of stimulation (e.g., interoception versus 
exteroception; see Meulders, this issue) and stimulus intensity (e.g., a strong versus mild 
unconditional stimulus; Dunsmoor, Kroes, Braren, & Phelps, 2017).  
With respect to the matter of external validity, the standard fear conditioning procedure 
has been criticized for relying on relatively simple stimulus material (e.g., geometrical figures 
as conditional stimuli) as compared to what may evoke fear in daily life (e.g., an audience in 
which some people are frowning). We do not deny that this might be the case, but we do oppose 
to an argumentation exclusively in terms of surface similarity. Whether or not stimuli in the 
model simply look like stimuli involved in the target phenomenon is not the crucial criterion. 
Models differ by definition from their target phenomenon (Weisberg, 2013). The crucial, and 
essentially empirical, question is whether study results obtained with such simplified model 
still extend to the target phenomenon, or whether models with more complex stimuli would do 
a better job. In spite of the fact that Watson and his successors emphasized the translational 
potential of fear conditioning from the early days of the field, such empirical work is still 
surprisingly rare and urgently needed (Scheveneels, Boddez, Vervliet, and Hermans, 2016).  
With respect to theory formation, the role of stimulus intensity has been incorporated in 
some models. For example, the Rescorla-Wagner model (1972) includes parameters that reflect 
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the intensity of the conditional and unconditional stimulus. However, a model that fully 
accounts for all stimulus characteristics is currently still lacking.  
8.2 Response characteristics 
The extent of the behavioral change that is due to the stimulus pairings may also depend on the 
conditional response that is under investigation. In accord with the pioneering work of Harold 
Jones, typical measures include physiological responding (e.g., skin conductance; for a 
discussion and new analysis tool, see Bach & Melinscak, this issue) and also ratings (e.g., US-
expectancy ratings; Boddez, Baeyens, Luyten, Vansteenwegen, Hermans, & Beckers, 2013). In 
addition, there is a resurgence of interest (Pittig, Wong, Glück, & Boschet, this issue) in 
procedures that additionally allow participants to prevent the occurrence of the unconditional 
stimulus by means of a designated response (i.e., an avoidance response). Other measures are 
possible though. For example, one can measure whether the conditional stimulus comes to 
evoke a visual image of the unconditional stimulus (i.e., imagery or “conditioned seeing”; see 
Mertens, Krypotos, & Engelhard, this issue) or include brain measures. Including multiple 
measures is of special theoretical interest in the case of response dissociations and in the case 
that responses form a causal network. We discuss both cases below.  
Response dissociations (e.g., skin conductance versus US-expectancy; Bechara et al., 
1995) provide a clear illustration of how the magnitude of the behavioral change due to stimulus 
pairings (i.e., of the conditioning effect) can depend on the behavior that is under investigation 
(i.e., moderation by response characteristics). Theories have so far almost exclusively focused 
on candidate mechanisms that drive the acquisition of information about stimulus relations in 
memory, but are surprisingly underdeveloped when it comes to accounting for the heterogeneity 
of conditional fear responding (i.e., the performance level; Honey, Dwyer, & Iliescu, 2020; 
Miller, Barnet, & Grahame, 1995). This is also illustrated by the fact that the terms ‘fear 
memory’ and ‘fear responding’ are sometimes used interchangeably, even though there are 
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instances where remembering an aversive event and being fearful do not go hand in hand (for 
a detailed discussion see Boddez et al., 2020; Zenses, Baeyens, Beckers, & Boddez, 2020). We 
see the development of a response account as a fundamental challenge for the future of our 
field. As such, we concur with Baeyens, Vansteenwegen, and Hermans (2009, p. 199) that a 
conditioning theory “that can explain all but conditioned behavior, is lacking something 
quintessential”.  
In the field of psychology at large, there is an increase in interest in network structures 
that detail relations among variables (Borsboom, Cramer, and Kalis, 2019). The general idea of 
this could be extended to conditional responses. In fact, evidence for causal networks of 
conditional responses is already starting to emerge. There is, for example, ongoing research on 
whether conditional changes in contingency judgments (sometimes termed “contingency 
awareness”) cause conditional changes in physiology (Mertens & Engelhard, 2020), on the 
conditional physiological responses that precede avoidance (Hunt, Cooper, Hartnell, & Lissek, 
2019; Pittig et al., this issue), and on the effect of the (pharmacological) manipulation of brain 
responses on conditional responses (Esser, Fuss, and Haaker, this issue). A thorough 
understanding of causal networks between responses is of theoretical interest, because a 
complete network could be considered a mechanistic theory that includes only observable 
events (to the researcher and / or to the participant; Skinner, 1953) and would be devoid of 
unobservable constructs (e.g., mental associations).  
8.3 Subject characteristics 
As noted in the section on post-Watsonian developments, the research community is highly 
invested in research about interindividual differences (e.g., in personality, age, sex, genetic 
makeup) in the extent to which stimulus pairings result in fear responding (i.e., differences in 
“trait conditionability”; Hammel et al., this issue; Klein, Shner, Ginat-Frolich, Vervliet, & 
Shechner, this issue; Peyrot, Brouillard, Morand-Beaulieu, Marin, this issue; Pölchen et al., 
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this issue). The idea is that – holding all other characteristics (e.g., stimulus intensities) equal – 
some individuals will show more fear when confronted with stimulus pairings as compared to 
other individuals. This idea could serve as one candidate-explanation for why not everybody 
who is confronted with an aversive conditioning event goes on to develop anxiety-related 
complaints in real life (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006).  
The research community fosters hope that individual differences in conditioning 
performance may eventually provide us with a premorbid marker of anxiety- and stress-related 
complaints. For this approach to be successful, it is required that the individual characteristics 
affect the level of responding in the fear conditioning procedure in the same way as how they 
affect the outcome (e.g., anxiety complaints) of being confronted with certain stimulus pairings 
outside the laboratory (e.g., being confronted with negative feedback after a presentation). In 
other words, this approach requires the absence of strong interactions between the individual 
characteristics and the other candidate moderators. For example, if individuals would only show 
stronger conditioning with a type of stimulus (e.g., critical feedback) or a type of behavior (e.g., 
negative thoughts) that is not modeled in the fear conditioning procedure, then successful 
prediction cannot be expected (also see Vervliet and Boddez, 2020). If this would turn out to 
be the case, then tailor-made models that do include the relevant stimuli and responses may 
come into the picture. Although tailor-made models (e.g., for social anxiety complaints; e.g., 
Blechert et al., 2015) may serve important research purposes (e.g., explaining and developing 
a treatment for such complaints), such models would have limitations as a premorbid marker, 
because they would necessarily angle for only a restricted range of complaints.   
More generally, it may be worthwhile to consider the status of the outcomes that we aim 
to predict in fear conditioning studies on premorbid markers. DSM-like diagnoses and some of 
the often-used questionnaires may allow for too much heterogeneity in complaint profiles to be 
useful outcomes (or predictors for that matter; Borsboom et al., 2019) and are likely to be only 
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distant proxies of the factors that do the causal work (e.g., prior learning history or goals; Moors, 
Boddez, and De Houwer, 2017). Indeed, it has been argued that science moves ahead by 
replacing concepts that lack a structural explanation (e.g. air has been rejected as a scientific 
concept because it is composed of different components such as oxygen, nitrogen, and 
carbonite; Moors, 2017).  
Last but not least, heightened conditionability would only lead to suffering in real-life 
if the individual is additionally exposed to triggering stimulus pairings (e.g., critical feedback 
after a presentation; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006).  However, as indicated above, current theories 
have little to say about what turns mere stimulus pairings – to which we are all constantly 
exposed – into stimulus pairings that support strong conditioning effects. As long as we lack 
precise ideas about which type of stimulus pairings are expected to trigger suffering, it will 
remain difficult to do a proper anamnesis in either research studies or clinical practice. Even in 
elegant prospective studies in which at-risk groups (e.g., soldiers or firemen) are followed over 
time (e.g., Lommen, Engelhard, Sijbrandij, van den Hout, and Hermans, 2013), there may be 
important differences in the characteristic of the stimulus pairings to which participants are 
exposed (e.g., was a soldier 10m or 100m removed from where the grenade struck?). In 
summary, there is a need for theories that allow for more precise predictions about individual 
differences in the onset and course of psychological suffering.  
9.   Long live the human fear conditioning model!  
We have argued that, following the pioneering work of Watson, the human fear conditioning 
procedure provides us with a toolbox to study learning and emotion. Laboratory studies have 
revealed ample information about the conditions under which stimulus pairings result in fear 
responses and have fed discussion about the mechanisms that drive the acquisition of 
information about stimulus relations. Fear conditioning research is praised by some, but 
criticized by others, for its potential to inform clinical practice. We argued that this is essentially 
 27 
an empirical question and hope for a breakthrough on this issue as well as for new exciting 
research findings and insights during the next 100 years. The future starts today: We hope that 
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1 Watson, Rayner and contemporaries ordinarily used the terms ‘conditioned’ and 
‘unconditioned’ to denote the different stimuli and responses in the conditioning situation. 
However, it has been noted that this is an inaccurate translation from the original Russian text 
(Todes, 2014). The correct translation would have been ‘conditional’ and ‘unconditional’, 
which captures more directly the core observation in conditioning: A stimulus comes to elicit 
a response conditionally upon its having been paired with a stimulus that unconditionally 
elicits a given response. For correctness, we use the terms ‘conditional’ and ‘unconditional’ 
throughout, except in citations and in direct references to titles of papers.   
 
2 For more background information on the Little Albert study and on the life story of its 
participant, we refer the interested reader to Beck, Levinson, and Irons (2009), Digdon, 
Powell, and Harris (2014), Eelen and Vervliet (2006), Field and Nightingale (2009), 
Hermans, Boddez, and Vervliet (2019), Powell, Digdon, Harris, and Smithson (2014). 
 
3It is of note that the term model may serve to highlight that one can also pragmatically 
consider the association formation model to be just one possible analogue that can help us to 
organize or gain knowledge about behavior (i.e., the target). As such, the association 
formation model does not necessarily have to — and is even unlikely to — correspond to 
what it is actually like in the mind (Boddez, Moors, Mertens, & De Houwer, 2020). This idea 
of the association formation model as an analogue might perhaps be easier to grasp if one 
considers that one could also realize such model physically (e.g., an actual landscape with 
neon signs that are connected with copper wires) rather than verbally (i.e., how they are 
typically presented in papers and textbooks; Weisberg, 2013), just as one can build physical 
models (e.g., different synthetic ion channels) of a physical phenomenon (e.g., natural ion 
 39 
channels). Even if the workings of such physical model do not fully correspond to the 
workings of the mind, it may still help us organize and gain knowledge about behavior (in the 
same way as a metaphor – or indeed an “analogy” – could).  
